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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper outlines an approach to a particular inferential problem that arises in 
the public health management of marketed drugs. The ideas that underlie this 
approach can be applied to a wide class of other problems, arising in medicine, 
engineering, business and public policy. The characteristics that these problems share 
can be described as follows: A panel of experts is assembled to recommend an 
appropriate course of action to some decision-maker: which action is appropriate 
depends in part on the experts· prediction (or retrodiction) about what will (or did) 
occur with respect to some phenomenon of interest. There are many different streams 
of evidence that affect the experts· judgement, relating to different factors and sources 
of information, involving different modes of knowing, from "hard" data to scientific 
theory to hunches based on professional lore and personal experience. These streams 
of evidence may point in different directions. The experts must evaluate the 
evidentiary significance of each of the streams, and then they must integrate their 
evaluations into an answer to the problem of primary inferential interest. How are 
they to proceed? 
The challenge is to design a procedure that satisfies two fundamental dicta, 
articulated by two of the greatest inferentialists of this century: Fisher's "never throw 
information awayl"I, and de Finetti's "don't contradict yourselfl"2 According to the 
Fisher dictum, all the evidence available to the experts should be incorporated into 
their overall solution, including the experts' opinions about each item's relative 
relevance and plausibility. And according to de Finetti's dictum, all these evaluations 
should be merged in a way that satisfies a reasonable set of desiderata for a logic of 
reasoning under uncertainty. 
The procedure described in this paper attempts to implement Fisher's dictum 
through the construction of an explicit, shared knowledge base incorporating elements 
from all the various relevant modes of knowing. De Finetti's dictum is implemented by 
using subjective probability to express the experts' collective uncertainty and then 
relying on de Finetti's theory of coherent inference to guarantee against self-
contradiction as the different streams of evidence are evaluated and merged. Since the 
measurement of uncertainty in the probability scale can be quite unreliable, as 
Tversky and his coworkers have documented (see Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky 
( 1982)), an attempt has been made in the work described here to differentiate 
l Paraphrased, for example from Fisher (1973). p. 113. 
2 The theme of de FineUi ( 1972) -- and most of his other works. 
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between the propositions that experts in the field can measure reliably -- here called 
accessible -- and those they cannot, and to elicit assessments from experts only with 
respect to the former and then deduce, through the rules of coherence, those 
evaluations of the latter that are necessary to the problem at hand. 
The next section introduces the problem of causality assessment for adverse drug 
reactions. The problem is described in terms of its role in postmarketing surveillance; 
it also comes up in clinical decision-making, setting editorial policies about the 
publication of reports of adverse effects in medical journals, and liability litigation (see 
Venulet et al. ( 1982) and Herman ( 1984)). 
2. CASE REPORTS AND CAUSALITY ASSESSMENT 
Serious adverse reactions to a drug usually occur too rarely to be identified in the 
clinical trials required to demonstrate efficacy before the drug can be put on the 
market. Instead, they are generally first encountered in the uncontrolled world of 
everyday clinical practice, and the industrial and national regulatory agencit~s that are 
responsible for drug safety must rely for their first indications of a possible drug-
adverse event connection on case reports submitted to them by practitioners who 
observe an occurrence of the event in one of their patients taking the drug. 
A typical situation in the work of these agencies finds a group of experts 
assembled around a table teviewing a small series of case reports (perhaps ilS small as 
onel) that link a particular drug with a particular type of adverse event. The first item 
on the agenda is to determine whether the link is just coincidental -- or, alteirnatively, 
whether the drug gn in fact cause the event to occur. The experts tackle this question 
by trying to determine whether, for each case in their series, the available evidence 
indicates that the drug diet cause the particular adverse event in question to occur. 
This problem is called causality assessment in drug safety circles, although a. more 
accurate name would be retrodictive causality assessment (RCA), since the problem 
begins with a particu~ar case in which the event has already occurred and looks 
backward in time to discover the event's unobservable cause. 
If the experts have determined that the drug can in fact cause the event to occur, 
the focus of interest of the drug safety agencies shifts to the second agenda item, which 
could be called the predictive causality assessment problem: what is the ch~nnce that 
the next patient who takes the drug will subsequently experience the adver:;e event? 
This is the critical question for most clinical and regulatory decisions about the use of 
the drug, since the evaluation of net benefit of drug use that should guide such 
decision-making depends on its answer. 
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The purpose of this paper is to discuss a procedure, based on the use of subjective 
probability, to carry out the expert panel's retrodictive causality assessments. The 
paper proceeds as follows. First, some of the difficulties of retrodictive causality 
assessment will be illustrated, using a case of fatal hepatitis that was submitted to the 
Centre de Pharmacovigilance Bordeaux-Aquitaine, one of the regional agencies 
responsible for monitoring adverse drug reactions in France. Next, the probabilistic 
causality assessment procedure will be described and applied to this case. This 
procedure will then be compared to some alternative possible methods, and some 
advantages of the procedure emphasized. Finally, some projects for developing the 
procedure will be briefly mentioned, including two applications that relate the results 
of probabilistic RCA to probabilistic predictive causality assessments. 
3. WHY RCA IS DIFFICULT 
RCA problems are difficult for two reasons: there is a lot that experts know that is 
relevant to a particular problem -- and there is a lot that they do not know. The 
former results in a proliferation of different factors and sources of information that 
have to be taken into ac~unt, and so causality assessment problems are complicated, 
while the latter requires the assessors to take account of the extent of their uncertainty 
in order to obtain valid assessments. More specifically, here are some particular 
sources of complication and uncertainty: 
( 1) Profusion of possible confounders and effect modifiers: Almost all drug-
associated adverse events have alternative possible nondrug etiologies, and there are 
rarely tests that can determine whether or not an adverse event is drug-caused. That 
is, for the most part, fulminant hepatitis is f ulminant hepatitis, whether the agent that 
initiates the pathological process is a virus, a drug or a toxic agent like carbon 
tetrachloride or alcohol. Most drug-associated adverse events can be caused by many 
different drugs, so even if it is possible to determine that an event is drug-caused, it 
can be difficult to decide which drug is responsible when the patient is taking more 
than one. In addition, there are usually many possible factors -- genetic, behavioral, 
medical --that can affect a patient's risk for experiencing the adverse event, from 
possible drug as well as nondrug causes. In the presence of all these confounders and 
effect modifiers, it is difficult to sort out what is affecting what, especially when all the 
relevant clinical information comes from the uncontrolled world of everyday practice. 
(2) The ambiguity of "third party" reports: Case reports are submitted by busy 
practitioners who may not be experts in adverse drug reactions. The experts who 
analyze the reports do not see the patients whose cases they are trying to understand, 
and they cannot control the nature or the ·quality of the information they review. From 
their point of view, critical information may be missing, difficult to interpret, or even 
erroneous. 
(3) The complexity of case information: While there is rarely a pathognomonic 
test that can conclusively solve a causality assessment problem, there are generally 
many different pieces of case information that can help differentially diagnose the 
cause of the event: the timing of the event in relation to administration of the drug, 
the clinical characteristics of the event as it develops through time, and, when they 
occur, the response to withdrawal (dechallenge) and readministration (rechallenge) of 
the drug. Often the evidence offered by these different pieces of information points in 
different directions. 
(4) The dispersion of expertise: Academic medicine is not organized around the 
problem of adverse drug reactions. Many different disciplines and sub specialties can 
provide critical background information for solving causality assessment problems: 
laboratory pharmacology, clinical pharmacology, epidemiology, and the "organ 
specialties" (nephrology, hepatology, and so forth) dealing with the locus of the disease 
which the suspect drug(s) are supposed to treat and the adverse event itself. But the 
relevance of what they know to the study of adverse drug reactions may not be 
obvious to these specialists, unless the proper questions are put to them by workers 
whose special expertise is the adverse effects of drugs. 
I will now illustrate some of these difficulties with a case of fatal hepatitis 
following the use of the drug amodiaquine as a malarial prophylactic. In the early 
'80's, amodiaquine was increasingly replacing chloroquine as the drug of choice for 
Europeans travelling to malarial endemic areas, because of the development of 
chloroquine-resistant malarial parasites. In this period, the French Centres de 
Pharmacovigilance and the drug's manufacturer began to receive reports of hepatitis 
occurring among travellers taking amodiaquine; several such reports had be~n 
received when this one arrived at the Centre de Pharmacovigilance Bordeaux-
Aquitaine. 
CASE SUMMARY 
The patient is a 38 year-old French woman who had lived in Gabon since 1981. 
From 1981 to 1983 she received chloroquine for malaria prophylaxis. On December 15, 
1983 {Day 0), she was taken off chloroquine and prescribed amodiaguine 600 mg once 
per week. Her subsequent clinical course is as follows: 
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Day 36: Patient tired, vomiting. 
Day 48: Jaundice. without fever or arthralgia. AgHBs negative. 
Day 50: HEPATIC TESTS: bilirubin 5 x normal; ASAT, ALAT 15. 25 x normal. 
DECHALLENGE (patient taken off amodiaquine). 
Day 60: Patient felt better. jaundice decreasing. No hepatic testing done. 
Day 67: RECHALLENGE (patient received 600 mg amodiaquine). 
Day 70: Jaundice and pruritis noted. HEPATIC TESTS: bilirubin 18 x normal; ASAT. 
ALAT 20, 25 x normal. 
Day 82: Patient's condition had so worsened that she was sent back to France. There 
she was noted to have severe jaundice. without sign of encephalopathy. She 
was given 100 mg of chloroquine. IMMUNOLOGICAL TESTS: AgHBs, antibody 
HBC, HV A (IgM) -- all negative. 
Day 83: Encephalopathy (grade 1 coma with asterixis). HEPATIC TESTS: bilirubin 20 
x normal; ASAT, ALAT 22, 25 I normal. 
Day 84: Grade 3 coma with severe respiratory disorder. 
Day 87: Patient dies. Postmortem biopsy showed almost complete hepatic necrolysis. 
Did amodiaquine cause this woman's hepatitis? Almost all of the forty or so 
physicians comprising the five group of experts with whom I have reviewed this case 
expressed a strong initial opinion that it did. This opinion is based on the fact that the 
hepatitis seemed to abate when the amodiaquine was withdrawn and reappeared in 
fulminant form shortly after readministration. TypicaUy, positive responses to 
dechallenge and especiaUy to rechallenge are regarded as very strong evidence in 
favor of drug causation. 
But in fact the situation is more complicated than that. First, viral hepatitis is 
endemic in Africa, and European residents face very high risks of contracting it, a risk 
- that continues to increase over their first several years of residency. Clearly, it is 
important to consider how high is this risk, compared to the magnitude of the risk for 
drug-induced hepatitis facing users of amodiaquine. Second, while the evidence from 
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the immunological testing tells against hepatitis A and hepatitis B, it offers no evidence 
against nonA-nonB (NANB) viral hepatitis; and NANB is often characterized by a 
"waxing and waning" course, so that a one or two month delay from onset until 
fulminance with at least subjective, symptomatic improvement in the middle of this 
period is not at all an unlikely course for NANB. How unlikely, compared to what 
would be expected in response to dechallenge and rechallenge for drug-induced 
hepatitis? Consider that amodiaquine has a long half-life (around a week); would it be 
reasonable to expect that drug-induced hepatitis would begin to abate in a week and a 
half? Third, was there really an improvement in the patient's underlying liver disease 
by day 60? Did she even see her physician on that day, or merely report to him her 
own impression that she was "feeling better" and ihat her jaundice was decreasing? 
The reports gives no information on this point, but the fact that no hepatic testing was 
done suggests that the patient might not have actually visited her doctor. And the 
bilirubin value on day 70 is strongly suggestive that the hepatitis had in fact not 
abated in response to dechallenge: can bilirubin levels increase from less than 5 to 18 
x normal in just three days? 
These are just a few. of the questions that make this case difficult to analyze. 
Notice that the first point requires epidemiological expertise, the second calls for input 
from pharmacology and clinical hepatology, while the third is primarily a question of 
theoretical physiologyl 
4. A PROBABILISTIC PROCEDURE FOR RCA 
4.1 Formulating the Problem 
The aim of the procedure is t~ evaluate the expert panel's posteriqr odds that a 
reported adverse event E was caused by a particular drug D: : .. 
( 1) P(D->EIB,C) P(D+>EIB,C) 
Here, P measures the panel's degree of belief, interpreted according to the 
economic metaphor introduced by de Finetti {see de Finetti ( 1972) and Lane ( 1981 )). 
The proposition "D->E" (D caused E) means that E would not have happened as and 
when it did bad D not been administered; "D+>E" denies D->E. B represents 
background information. including all the knowledge the panel can assemble relevant 
to the connection between the drug D and events similar to E (from their own clinical 
experience, collected case series and epidemiological studies, facts and theories from 
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pharmacology and other basic sciences). The only case-specific information in B is the 
proposition that a patient with a specified clinical condition M who has been 
administered drug Din a specified way subsequently develops an adverse event of 
type B1 (M and Bi are generic characterizations, explicitly defined by the panel as part 
of the assessment procedure, that describe essential elements of the patient's condition 
and the event E, respectively; together with D. they define a kind of epidemiological 
reference set. of which the particular patient whose case is under review is a member). 
C represents case information: details about the particular patient and her adverse 
event E. 
The panelists cannot apply their expertise directly to assess the posterior odds. 
There seem to be two types of propositions about which these experts can comfortably 
measure their uncertainty in the probability scale: propositions which bear a 
frequency interpretation that relates to verifiable events occurring in patient 
populations similar to those of their own clinical experience or that of their colleagues, 
reported personally or in the medical literature; or propositions that can be interpreted 
in terms of an acceptable theoretical model for the phenomenon to which the 
proposition refers, from which frequency predictions can be calculated. 
The proposition "D->E" is not of these types. As with any counterf actual 
proposition, "D->B" is essentially unobservable: this patient :w.u prescribed D before 
she experienced E, so that it is impossible to observe directly what would have 
happened had she not been administered the drug at this time. Moreover, in contrast 
to some other diagnostic problems in which additional confirming information can 
eventually result in certain knowledge about cause, it is rarely the case with adverse 
drug reactions that~ useful case information beyond what is contained in the case 
report itself will ever be obtained. Thus, it is hard to accumulate clinical experience on 
"similar" cases that can give a direct interpretation to the proposition "D->E" in terms of 
the frequency of any observable event. And theoretical models for phenomena do not 
help, since they predict from cause to effect, not the other way around as required for 
the proposition "D->E". 
The strategy that underlies the probabilistic procedure for RCA is to decompose 
the posterior odds into components that involve propositions that m:g_ accessible to the 
knowledge and experience of the expert panelists. Then, the rules of probability 
theory are used to merge the solution to these component assessment problems into a 
solutions to the overall RCA problem. The implementation of that strategy begins with 
an application of Bayes' theorem, as follows: 
(2) 
8 
P(D->EIB,C) P(D->EilB) P(CID->E,B) 
P(D+>EIB,C) - P(D+>EilB) • P(CID+>E,B) 
posterior odds prior odds likelihood ratio 
Both the posterior and prior odds are calculated conditionally on Band so refer to a 
patients with clinical condition M who has been administered D and experienced an 
event of type Bi- However, the identity of the patient to whom the two terms refer is 
different. In the posterior odds, it is the subject of the case report under review; while 
in the prior odds, it is a "generic" patient (perhaps the "next" patient) with the three 
defining characteristcs M. D, and Et. Thus, the prior odds can be regarded 
epidemiologically, as will be discussed below; on the other hand, the probabilities in 
the likelihood ratio involve thinking in terms of mechanism. arguing from cause to 
effect. 
It is helpful to consider the information in C in chronological order. A typical 
chronological sequence is illustrated in Figure 1. 
-- FIGURE 1 GOES HERB --
The categories of case information include Hi, .the patient's history antedating the 
onset of B; Ti. the timing of the onset of B in relation to the ad ministration of D; Cb, 
characteristics of the event from time of onset to time of dechallenge; which can 
include information about duration, severity, evolution, and laboratory tests; .De, 
response to dechallenge; and Re, response to rechallenge. The likelihood ratio (LR) is 
decomposed into factors, corresponding to these chronological categories of case 
information: 
(3) LR= LR(Hi) • LR(Ti) • LR(Ch) • LR(De) • LR(Re), 
where, for example, 
LR(T") P(TilD->E, B, Hi) 
l :s P(TilD+>E, B, Hi) 
Note that the probabilities that appear in each likelihood ratio factor are evaluated 
conditionally on Band all chronologically preceding case information. The probabilistic 
approach to RCA is designed to calculate the posterior odds in favor of D-causation, by 
evaluating the subjective probabilities that appear in the prior odds and the likelihood 
ratio factors corresponding to the chronological categories of case information. 
·, 
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In the discussion that follows. the procedure will be illustrated with an 
assessment carried out by a panel of of experts from McGill University and the 
University of Montreal. Members of the panel included Dr. Michael Kramer 
(Departments of Pediatrics and Epidemiology. McGill). Dr. Tom Hutchinson 
(Departments of Medicine and Epidemiology. McGill), Dr. Walter Bloom (Department of 
Medicine. McGill), Dr. Pierre Biron (Department of Pharmacology, Montreal), Dr. Pierre 
Toussignant (Department of Epidemiology. McGill). and Ms. Marie Mouchbahani 
(Department of Pharmacy. Royal Victoria Hospital, Montreal). I served as moderator 
for the panel and Ms. Patti Groome (Clinical Epidemiology Division, Royal Victoria 
Hospital) coordinated literature searches. 
4.2 Implementing the Procedure I: Gathering the Evidence 
The purpose of this phase of the procedure is to assemble and organize the 
background and case information conditionally on which the posterior odds is 
calculated. The work proceeds by a general discussion of the panel, guided by a 
moderator who poses a series of questions about case parameters and differentially 
diagnostic case information. 
First, the panel assesses the values of four case parameters: .M and Rt create an 
epidemiological reference set for the patient under consideration; the cause list . 
specifies the alternative etiological candidates: and the lime horizon determines a 
period of time to which all considerations about drug-event connection are restricted . 
.If and B,: Et specifies the general type of the adverse event E, and M abstracts 
out the most important aspects of the patient's condition that determine his risk for 
events of type Et from causes other than the drug under consideration. It is important 
to define these parameters as explicitly as possible. 
Sometimes, there will be a question about whether to include certain aspects of the 
patient's condition or the event in the definitions of these parameters or in the 
appropriate chronological categery of case information. The choice should be guided by 
the ease of the ensuing assessments and so depends on the assessors' experience and 
information; roughly, the assessors should choose definitions for M and Et that make it 
easiest for them to "think epidemiologically" about the class determined by these 
definitions. The essential thing is consistency in the course of the assessment: M and 
Et are included in B, the background information, and are part of the reference set for 
every calculation. 
Cause list: The cause list consists of a set of mutually exclusive propositions 
about the possible causes of E. Typically, there are a number of possible hypotheses 
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specifying drug causal candidates -- say D1 ..... Dn -- followed by a number of 
hypotheses specifying nondrug causes. 
The requirement that the propositions on the cause list be mutually exclusive is 
somewhat artificial and requires a bit of care in defining and interpreting the 
propositions. For example, suppose the assessors believe that an interaction between 
drugs DA and De may have caused E. Then they should have a separate entry on the 
cause list r or this interaction: and if they also believe that either drug alone may also 
have caused E, they must include entries for "DA alone" (that is. "E would have 
happened as and when it did had DA and not De been given. but not if De and not DA 
had been given") and "Du alone". Similarly, there is an asymmetry between drug and 
nondrug causes: because of the definition of the proposition "D caused E" for a possible 
drug cause D, if N is a possible nondrug cause, the proposition .. N caused E" implies 
ihat "E would have happened as and when it did had none of the drugs mentioned in 
D1, ... , Dn been given." Finally, since causality assessment focuses on the question of 
drug responsibility, it is possible to lump together different nondrug causes. as long as 
they give the same probability to each piece of case data that distinguishes drug from 
nondrug causation. 
Ti.111e /Jorizos: B includes the assertion that a patient with condition M 
experiences an event of type Et- The time horizon puts an upper limit on the length of 
time after D-therapy begins in which it is asserted that the event occurs. To choose the 
time horizon, the assessors should think about the distribution for the onset of an 
event of type Et that is caused by D; the time horizon should be about as long as the 
support of this distribution. It is easy to see that. for coherent assessors, the exact 
value selected will not affect the resulting posterior odds. The reason for specifying a 
time horizon at all is that doing so increases the accessibility of some of the assessment 
tasks (especially the prior odds and likelihood ratio for timing). 
The values for the case parameters assessed by the panel for the example case are 
given in Figure 2 below. 
· -- FIGURE 2 GOES HERE --
Next, the panel sorts out which of case data differentiate among the possible 
causes and lists these by chronological category. The evidentiary significance of each 
listed item is supported by heuristic arguments that prepare the way for the 
quantitative phase of the evaluation. Frequently, these arguments depend on 
conjectures that the panelists feel require support beyond what their own expertise 
provides. and so specific queries are formulated for literature reviews or elicitation of 
the opinion of outside experts. (The members of the panel themselves and the 
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research coordinator Ms. Groome elicited information and opinion from the relevant 
outside experts.) 
The case information considered relevant in the preliminary review by the 
Montreal panel for the example case is shown in Figure 3 below. The discussions that 
culminated in the information as presented in Figures 2 and 3 required a single session 
of two hours. 
-- FIGURE 3 GOES HERE --
4.3 Implementing the Procedure I I; Pruning Information 
The purpose of this phase of the RCA procedure is to carry out a semi-
quantitative, order-of-magnitude analysis to eliminate from detailed consideration 
causes that will have very low posterior probability and case information that will not 
effectively discriminate between the causes with appreciable posterior probability. It 
is, after all, pointless to evaluate probabilities that will have no real effect on the 
overall causality assessment. 
The first task is to distinguish between primary and secondary causes. Primary 
causes are at least two orders of magnitude more likely than secondary causes, and so 
the detailed quantitative assessment in the next phase of the procedure can be 
restricted to partitioning probability among the primary causes. Should the detailed 
assessments reveal that primary causes are in fact less well-supported (or suggest that 
certain secondary causes are in fact better-supported) than initially believed, 
secondary causes can be upgraded as necessary. 
A useful tactic to determine that a given possible cause is secondary is to find a 
particular combination of factors or pieces of evidence that tell strongly against the 
cause relative to another possible cause, determine an order-of-magnitude bound for 
how strongly, and then check to see that no other factor or piece of evidence 
sufficiently favors the given cause to allow it to "catch up· with the test primary cause 
to within· two orders of magnitude. 
For example: compare chloroquine to amodiaquine with respect to timing and 
prior. According to the panel's judgement, timing is at least ten times more likely for 
amodiaquine, because "short onset" (within four months) is at least as likely as "long 
onset .. (from 6 months to several -- say S -- years), and if each of these timing 
distributions is roughly uniform on the appropriate interval, the likelihood ratio 
between a short and long onset drug is greater than 15. The actual onset distributions, 
if they were carefully assessed, would tend to increase this ratio in favor of the short 
onset drug (but it was not obvious to the panelists that the ratio would be greater than 
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100, or two orders of magnitude). The prior also tells strongly in favor of amodiaquine, 
since chloroquine has been much more extensively used than amodiaquine (probably 
two or more orders of magnitude), with even less reports of suspected hepatic 
reactions. Thus the timing and prior taken together give a comfortable two order of 
magnitude cushion to amodiaquine over chloroquine, and no other evidence favors 
chloroquine at all, so it cannot "catch up." 
In the example assessment, only two primary causal candidates survived the 
pruning: NANB and amodiaquine (hereafter D). The panel could not determine 
whether either dominated the other without a detailed analysis, carried out in the next 
phase of the analysis. 
Case information can be dropped at this stage for two reasons. First, the literature 
searches and outside expert assessments may not confirm some of the conjectures on 
which the panel believed some data's evidentiary significance to rest. Second, data 
that may differentiate between some of the causes on the initial list may fail to 
djfferentiate between the causes that remain on the pruned list. Here is an example 
illustrating both these possibilities: based on their review of the literature on cases of 
viral and drug-induced hepatitis meeting the definition of Et (based on drugs whose 
pathophysiologic mechanisms were regarded as similar to those entertained for 
amodiaquine, as well as previous cases of amodiaquine-associated hepatitis). the 
panelists assessed similar distributions for enzyme and bilirubin values for the two 
primary causes, D and NANB; these distributions did differ from the distribution of 
values associated with hepatitis B. but because of the immunological test results, this 
was now a secondary cause. 
The pruned list of case information as determined by the Montreal panel is 
presented in Figure 4 below. This phase of their assessment took about one hour, in 
addition to the substantial time between meetings spent by the research assistant 
carrying out the required literature searches. 
-- FIGURE 4 GOES HERE --
4.4 Implementing the Procedure II I; Assessing the Evidence 
This is the quantitative phase of the procedure. The panel must evaluate a series 
of probabilities that will determine their values for the prior odds , and they must 
assess their probabilities for each piece of case information on the pruned list, 
conditional on each primary cause and all chronologically preceding case information. 
These assessment problems will be discussed in reference to the example case below. 
First, I will comment on the process under which the assessments are carried out. 
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There are two essential steps in the assessment process: first, the propositions 
whose probabilities are to be assessed must be precisely formulated; next, an 
assessment for each of these propositions that represents the "shared expertise" of the 
entire panel must be generated. The goal of the formulation step is to produce 
propositions that are accessible to the knowledge and experience of the panelists. As 
stated above, we have found that our medical experts can think about propositions 
formulated in terms of the frequencies with which well-defined events occur among 
well-defined patient populations that the panelists can readily visualize, on the basis of 
. their own clinical experience or that of their professional colleagues as described 
anecdotally or in the medical literature: or they can think about propositions referring 
to predictions derived from theoretical models for possible pathophysiological 
mechanisms. Thus, the moderator must set each proposition to be evaluated in one of 
these two contexts. 
When panelists disagree in their evaluations for the probabilities of propositions 
formulated in these two ways, we have found that there are almost always differences 
in their underlying "knowledge bases" relative to the relevant clinical experience or 
posited mechanisms. Our approach to such disagreements in probability evaluations is 
to initiate discussions that explicate these "knowledge base" differences and allow the 
formation of a pooled knowledge base, in terms of which new propositions are 
formulated, whose probabilities are then related to the probabilities that are required 
for the RAC problem by the rules of coherence. For example, if additional possible 
mechanisms have been introduced, the law of total probabilities can be employed to 
merge the evaluations conditional on each mechanism in the augmented list: or if 
someone has contributed new information equivalent to the knowledge of additional 
relevant occurrence frequencies, Bayesian updating can be used. In our experience, 
this process of explicit knowledge-pooling generally produces probability assessments 
that represent a consensus of opinion among the panelists. If disagreements still 
persist that cannot be resolved in this way, the panel measures their collective 
uncertainty by means of a distribution around the probability in question. 
4. 4.1. Evaluating the Prior Odds 
According to the definition of the prior odds (equation 2), its value is the panelists' 
answer to the following question: consider a class of patients with condition M who 
receive D and subsequently (within the time horizon) experience an event of type Et; in 
what proportion of these patients is the event caused by D? Alternatively, the same 
problem can be posed from a prospective point of view, as follows. Imagine a large 
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class of patients with M. Suppose half of them are selected at random and receive D, 
while the rest receive some alternative therapy with the same beneficial effects as D, 
but which cannot cause events of type Bi- Let P(EtlD) represent the panel's estimate of 
the proportion of the patients who receive D that experience events of type Bi, and 
P(BtlI)C ), the corresponding estimate for the proportion of those who do not receive D. 
Then, 
(3) P{EtlD) - P{E11Dc) prior odds = P(BtlOC) 
Thus, one strategy for assessing the prior odds is to use what information is 
available to evaluate the two quantities PCEtlD) and P(BtDc) as defined above, and then 
use equation (3) to determine the prior odds. As a result, assessing the prior odds calls 
for techniques for doing synthetic (or "meta-analytic") epidemiology: combining 
information from a variety of different sources to inf er what the incidences would be 
in an imaginary "clinical trial". Usually, the resulting opinion about these incidences is 
sufficiently diffuse that it is best to assess subjective distributions for these quantities 
and then to evaluate the means of these distributions to plug into (3). 
There are four kinds of information that can have an effect on an assessor's 
uncertainty about the incidence of an adverse event E following the use of D. First, 
there can be knowledge of possible pathophysiological mechanisms related to known 
actions of the drug, perhaps supported by data from animal toxicology experiments or 
premarketing studies on human subjects. Second, D may be related pharmacologically 
or chemically to other drugs, for which data bearing on adverse effects exist, and these 
related frequencies may suggest plausible values for the incidence of similar adverse 
effects of D. Third, it is possible to use the number of reports that have been received 
by the drug's manufacturer or to a national monitoring agency, together with estimates 
for the fraction of all cases that are reported to the agency and the number of patients 
in the population exposed to the drug to generate indirect frequencies that provide an 
estimate of the incidence of E f ollow~g the use of D. Finally, once a suspicion about the 
D-B connection has crystallized, epidemiological studies may be carried out to 
investigate it. The direct frequencies obtained from these studies may have to be 
adjusted to take into account the different patient populations observed by the 
different studies, the different variables they measured, and the different research 
designs they employed. Each of these kinds of information can be converted into 
distributions for the relevant incidences; typically, mechanistic arguments produce the 
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most diffuse distributions. with each of the types of frequencies producing sharper 
distributions in the order in which they are listed. In particular, moderately extensive 
direct frequency information. when available. generally dominates everything else. 
The Montreal panel's evaluation of the prior odds in the example case relied 
primarily on indirect frequencies to estimate P(EtlD} and direct frequencies (with 
substantial adjustment required) for P(EtlDC}. For succinctness. I will restrict to their 
point assessments rather than the uncertainty distributions for these quantities; the 
emphasis of this summary will be on the number of different factors and sources of 
information they had to take into account in arriving at their answers. and how the 
evidence from these factors and sources was amalgamated. 
The panel estimated P(EtlD} as follows. At the time of their evaluation. French 
investigators from industry and the Centres de Pharmacovigilance were carrying out a 
national survey to identify all cases of liver disease following amodiaquine prophylaxis 
among Frenchmen who travelled abroad (Lenoir ( 1987)). Based on 22 ascertained 
cases, and estimating number of travellers exposed from prescription data, these 
investigators estimated that 1 in 15000 prophylaxis courses result in liver disease, of 
which perhaps 60 I meet the definition of Et, giving an incidence for ascertained Et of 4 
per 100,000 courses. How effective was their ascertainment? Given the high 
probability of hospitalization given Et and the intensity .of their search, the panel 
assumed that the ascertainment rate was better than 50%, probably close to 751. 
Thus, their estimate for P(BtlD) was between 4 and 8 per 100,000, and they adopted 6 
per 100,000 as their point estimate. 
Next, they estimated the numerator of equation (3) by considering: how many of 
these cases were actually caused by D? They decided that most of the cases of liver 
disease occurring among travellers taking D were actually due to D, for the following 
reasons. First, the French investigators eliminated any cases that tested positively for 
hepatitis A or B or could be convincingly attributed to alcohol. Next, temporary 
travellers to regions where the prevalence of viral hepatitis is high are likely to take 
gamma globulin shots; other studies of travellers' hepatitis make it unlikely that the 
incidence for non-drug caused Et could be much higher than around 1 per 100,00 per 
year, roughly the overall incidence of NANB among European adults, or about 3 per 
million over the four month time horizon. Thus, the panel's estimate for the incidence 
of Et due to amodiaquine among French travellers taking the drug is 6 per 100,000. 
Finally, the panel assumed that the rate of drug-induced liver disease should be 
comparable for Europeans taking the drug in Africa as for French travellers. Also, the 
available case series (from France and Switzerland -- Larrey et al. ( 1986), Neftel et al. 
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( 1986)) gave no grounds for supposing that age and sex modify the risk for 
amodiaquine-induced liver disease. Thus, their estimate for the attributable incidence 
of amodiaquine-induced Bi for a patient with clinical condition M is 6/ 100,000. 
To estimate P(EilDC), the panel needed information on the incidence of NANB 
among middle-aged European women resident in Gabon for 3 years. They could not 
obtain such information directly, so they constructed the following chain of reasoning 
based on what data they did find. First, they concluded that among cases of viral 
hepatitis in adults in Africa, about 20% are not due to hepatitis A and B (so they are 
due to what I am here calling NANB) -- and that this is for whites as well as blacks, 
though the data on this point is sketchy (Crocchiolo et al. ( 1984), Greenfield et al. 
( 1984)). Among African cases of NANB, it is not generally possible to determine the 
mode of transmission as it is in Europe or America (so the fact that there is no mention 
in this case of transfusion, parenteral injection, drug use, etc., does not affect the 
estimated incidence for NANB). 
The best information on incidence rates of viral hepatitis among white residents of 
Africa came from a study on hepatitis A and B among American missionaries and their 
families (Kendricks ( )). These rates climb from years 1 to 3 of residence in endemic 
· areas, then fall. For middle-aged women in their third year of residence in Africa, the 
panel estimated an attack rate of about 2 per 100. Based on their previous estimate 
that the incidence of NANB is 251 of the incidence for A and B combined, this yields an 
estimate of 5 per 1000 per year for NANB. 
The panel supposed that missionaries and their families would have a higher rate 
of viral hepatitis than the typical European resident in Africa, because of greater 
exposure to the native population and generally lower living standards. How much 
higher? This question is critical for the assessment, and the panel had no data on 
which to base their answer; their guesses ranged from 2 to 5 times higher. These 
guesses yield an estimated rate of NANB for all middle-aged European women in their 
third year of African residence of 1 to 2.5 per 1000 per year. For a point estimate, the 
panel settled on 1.5 per 1000 per year. With a four month time horizon, they thus 
estimated an incidence rate of NANB within the time horizon of 5 per 10,000. 
Finally, the panel had to determine the fraction of NANB cases that satisfied their 
definition of Et. To answer this question, they used data on NANB presented in a 
survey paper and in several published case series (Dienstag ( 1983 ), Farrow et al. 
( 1981 ), Kryger et al. ( 1980) ). They concluded from this data that slightly less than half 
of all NANB cases have bilirubin levels less than 3 x normal and about 40% of these 
cases have enzyme values less than 5 x normal. Although no data was presented on 
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the joint distribution of these variables, the panel's internists claimed on the basis of 
their own experience that low values of bilirubin tend to be associated with low 
enzyme levels, and they estimated that about half of the NANB cases met the definition 
of Et. 
Thus. the panel came up with an estimate of 2.5/ 10,000 for P(BtlOC), and so 
. 6/100000 
prior odds m 2.5/ 10000 • 0.24. 
4.4.2 Evaluating the Likelihood Ratio Factors 
To evaluate the likelihood ratio factors, the probability for each item on the 
pruned list of case information must be evaluated, given each possible cause and all 
preceding data. Even though only the probability for the data actually observed plays 
a role in these likelihood ratio factors, to ensure meaningful and reliable results, it is 
important to evaluate these probabilities in their proper context. For example, for 
information that refers to timing (time to onset of E, duration of E before dechallenge, 
time of disappearance of E after dechallenge ), it is best to construct entire timing 
distributions for the relevant events, as illustrated in the first example below. Similar 
considerations hold for probabilities about the results of laboratory tests. 
In general, the likelihood ratio factors are easier to evaluate than the prior odds, 
except in those rare situations in: which data from large, well-designed epidemiological 
studies can be used to provide direct frequency estimates for all the possible causal 
candidates. The propositions that appear in the likelihood ratio factors are often 
directly accessible to an individual physician's personal clinical experience (when they 
refer to observable events that happen relatively frequently) or clearly related to 
mechanistic ideas that are generally shared by the relevant experts. I will now 
summarize two of the likelihood evaluations from the Montreal panel's analysis of the 
amodiaquine-hepatitis case. 
LR(TD: The panel had to assess the probability that the first prodrome (tiredness, 
vomiting) would begin in the fifth week after beginning amodiaquine therapy (Ti), as a 
function of cause. Since there is no relation between the onset of viral infection and 
drug use (given that the patient had already been in Africa for three years when she 
began taking D), the onset distribution given NANB-causation is uniform on the 
sixteen-week time interval determined by the time horizon, and so P(TilNANB->E) = 
1/16. 
To the panel members, the onset distribution given D-causation depends on 
mechanism. Two possible mechanism types were considered: immunologic and dose-
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related (metabolic). The panelists (and other adverse drug reaction experts) associate 
a standard distributional shape (unimodal, with a gradual right hand tail) with both 
these mechanisms; the appropriate time scale depends on the event type Er,, the dose 
schedule and pharmacologic properties of the drug D. To assess the distributions given 
mechanisms for this problem, the moderator queried the panel members first about 
the distribution's range (1-14 weeks for the immunologic distribution; 1 to 20 half-
lives for the dose-related distribution), the mode (4-5 weeks; 9 to 10 half-lives), and 
concentration (SOS chance of onset between 3.5 and 6 weeks for the immunologic 
distribution). The resulting distributions are sketched in Figures 5 and 6. There were 
very little differences among the panelist's individual assessments, and they were 
easily resolved in a short discussion. The probabilities that the first prodrome would 
begin in the fifth week of treatment assigned by the two distributions are 0.15 and 
0.05, for the _immunologic and dose-related mechanisms respectively. 
-- FIGURES 5, 6 GO HERE --
To complete the evaluation of P(TilD->E), the panel had to assess its probability 
that the reaction is of each of the two posited types. Though this assessment task does 
not belong to either of the two classes of accessible assessments described above, the 
experts of this panel (and all the other ones with which I work) seem able to address 
it, by means of a kind of meta-frequency expert consensus: that is, there seems to be a 
generally shared opinion about what proportion of all drugs that can cause a particular 
event type Et do so by each of a particular set of possible mechanisms. Some of these 
mechanism distributions are presented in standard texts on drug-induced disease. The 
Montreal panel initially favored an immunologic distribution· 3: 1 over a dose-related 
one. However, some of the data in the case series collected by the French investigators 
differentiates between the two mechanism-types: in particular, the onset times for the 
9 cases in the series that were available to the Montreal group favored the dose-
related mechanism over the immunologic one by a likelihood factor of 2.25, while the 
incidence of fever (more likely with an immunologic than a dose-related mechanism) 
among these cases slightly favored the immunologic mechanism (likelihood factor~ 
0.89 ). overall, these data favor the dose-related mechanism by a factor of 2, giving 
posterior odds in favor of the immunologic mechanism of 1.5. corresponding to a 
posterior probability of 0.6 that the mechanism of amodiaquine-induced hepatitis is 
immunologic. 
Thus, P(TilD->E) = (0.15)•(0.6) + (0.05)•(0.4) = 0.1 Land so 
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LR(Ti) a f i~ ~ m 1.8 
LR(De-Re ): For this case, the panel pref erred to evaluate the data in De and Re out 
of chronological order. The data judged differentially diagnostic from the time of 
dechallenge until the patient's death can be listed as follows: 
( 1 ) the hepatitis is fulminant, resulting in death from hepatic necrosis. 
(2) on day 70 (three days after rechallenge), liver function tests gave the 
following values: bilirubin 18 x normal: enzymes 20 - 25 x normal. 
(3) hepatic encephalopathy began on day 83. 
(4) on day 60 (10 days after dechallenge) "the patient felt better, jaundice 
decreasing." 
The key to the panel's analysis of this data is the claim that, given data elements 
( 1), (2) and (3) above, datum (4) is not differentially diagnostic. I will just sketch the 
argument that supports this claim, without reproducing the actual calculations. The 
basic idea is this: according to the liver experts consulted by the panelists (none of 
whom were themselves hepatologists), under most circumstances bilirubin can only 
increase by about 3 x normal per day; not only can a theoretical justification be given 
for this statement, but none of the experts consulted could ever remember having seen 
bilirubin increase by more than 4 x normal per day, absent renal failure. If the data 
element ( 4) really represents a "real" rather than a merely subjective positive response 
to dechallenge, then bilirubin must have dropped below 5 on day 60 -- and, since no 
more drug was administered until day 67, stayed below 5 until day 67. But then, 
according to data element (2), billrubin would have had to increase over 13 x normal in 
just three days, an exceedingly unlikely event. Thus, a "real" positive response to 
dechallenge implies a nearly impossible 11real11 positive response to rechallenge. On the 
other hand, if the patient's improvement on day 60 is merely subjective, or the result 
of a 11real11 slight fluctuation in an otherwise progressing case of fulminant hepatitis, 
then the data element (4) fails to discriminate between D and NANB causation (or in 
fact slightly favors NANB, since this disease is frequently characterized by a relapsing 
course). 
According to the panelists assessments, which depended to a large extent on data 
presented in several published case series of fulminant NANB (McNeil et al. ( 1984), 
Gimson et al. (1983), Mathiesen et al. (1980) as well as some general information on 
drug-induced liver disease, data element ( 1) (the fact that the patient died of hepatic 
necrosis) failed to distinguish between D and NANB, while the values of the liver 
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function tests on day 70 slightly favored NANB. However, data element (3), giving the 
time from onset to encephalopathy, favored D-causation, with a likelihood factor of 3.S. 
Overall, then, for the example case, the Montreal panel assessed the value of 
LR(De-Re) as 3.S, and so 
posterior odds - prior odds • LR(Ti) • LR(De-Re) 
= (0.24) • ( 1.8) • (3.5) 
= 1.S, 
so the posterior probability in favor of D-causation is 1.5/2.5 = 0.6. 
The evaluation phase for this case took the panel about three hours, spread over 
two sessions two weeks apart. In addition, the group·s research assistant spent quite a 
lot of time between sessions assembling information from the medical literature and 
the French investigators on the amodiaquine-hepatitis study, several of the panel 
members interviewed clinical colleagues in Montreal, parti~ularly hepatologists, and 
the moderator spent time between sessions structuring the elicitation protocol. 
It is worth recalling that the result differs from the initial judgement expressed 
by almost all the panelists: it does not appear to be a definite case of drug-induced 
hepatitis, but rather nearly a toss-up. The panelist's initial judgement did not seem to 
take into account the evidence evaluated in the prior odds, particularly the high 
incidence of NANB in the epidemiological reference set defined by M. Moreover. the 
initial judgement was driven by the perception that positive responses to dechallenge 
and rechallenge had occurred, which had to be modified in the course of the 
probabilistic analysis. 
Two other panels performed independent probabilistic analyses of this case. Both 
consisted of academic, industrial and Pharmacovigilance experts in adverse reactions in 
France (one in Paris, the other in Bordeaux). The results of the first two phases of the 
analysis were virtually identical for the three groups. Differences emerged in the 
quantitative evaluations, although the Paris and Montreal groups obtained similar 
results (though they took different information into account in evaluating the prior 
odds). The Paris group contained several experts in liver disease and several of the 
amodiaquine-hepatitis investigating group; as a result. they arrived at their 
evaluations of the likelihood ratio terms quite a bit more quickly, with less reliance on 
literature searches, than did the Montreal group. The Bordeaux group missed the 
significance of the day 70 bilirubin value, in part because they were reluctant to 
devalue the literal meaning of the day 60 .. positive response .. to dechallenge. However, 
when presented with the Montreal analysis, they agreed with the probability 
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assessments outlined above for LR(De-Re) and modified their own interpretation of the 
case accordingly. 
4. SOME ADV ANT AGFS OF THE PROBABILISTIC RCA PROCEDURE 
There are two other RCA procedures in current use. The usual approach to a RCA 
problem is global illtrospection: that is, the expert assessor collects all the facts that 
he thinks are relevant to the problem at hand, mixes then together in his head -- and 
then he just decides what his answer is. This answer is usually expressed in terms of a 
qualitative probability scale: for example, "definite"/"probable"/"doubtful"/ or 
"unrelated". 
Unfortunately, global introspection does not work well. Several groups of clinical 
pharmacologists have demonstrated how unreliable global introspection is, by 
comparing their individual evaluations of a series of suspected adverse drug reactions 
and documenting the extent of their disagreement (Karch et al. ( 1976), Koch-Weser et 
al. ( 1977), Dangomau et al. ( 1980 )). In addition, global introspection is uncalibrated: 
one assessor's "possible" might mean the same thing as another assessor's "probable". 
Other problems with global instrospection are discussed in Lane ( 1984) and Kramer 
(1986). 
Because of these problems with global introspection, during the past decade 
physicians from industry, regulatory agencies and academia have developed more than 
a dozen standardized assessment methods (SAM) for RCA (see Venulet et al. ( 1982), 
Herman ( 1984) and Steqpens ( 1985, 1987) for reviews and examples of these 
methods). These SAM range from simple flow charts posing ten or fewer questions to 
lengthy questionnaires containing up to 84 items. However, they share a common 
basic structure. They divide the considerations that bear on causality assessment into 
a number of factors or axes: for example, timing; alternative etiological candidates; 
previous recognition of the event as a possible adverse reaction to the drug; 
dechallenge; rechallenge. Information relevant to each factor is elicited by a series of 
questions, the answers to which are restricted to yes/no/(and for some methods) don't 
know. 
The questions typically call for a direct evaluation of the expert's inferences about 
the evidence, without explicitly eliciting the scientific or clinical knowledge that 
underlies the inference. For example, every SAM poses a question like "Was the timing 
of the event as expected for an adverse reaction to this drug?" To answer this 
question, the evaluator need not consider his predictive distribution for onset time, nor 
the meaning of "expected" relative to the spread of such a distribution. Also, he need 
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not consider whether the timing is more or less "as expected" relative to any other 
possible cause: the evidential significance of the timing information is determined just 
by the answer to this question ("yes" favors drug-causation; "no" tells against it). 
The evaluator answers to the SAM's questions are then converted to a score for 
each factor, the factor scores are summed, and this overall score is converted into a 
value on a qualitative probability scale. As an indication of the way in which SAM 
process case information, all SAM to which I have applied the example case score it a 
"definite" for amodiaquine causation, primarily because of the "positive" responses to 
dechallenge and rechallenge. 
The probabilistic RCA has several advantages when compared to these alternative 
procedures: 
( 1) Explicitness: Unlike global introspection, and to a greater extent than any 
SAM, it is explicit: it requires the assessors to define the values of the case parameters 
that underlie their deliberations, to list all the evidence that they regard as 
differentially diagnostic, to measure in an interpretable scale their evaluation of the 
evidentiary significance of each separate listed item. 
(2) Completeness: Unlike SAM, with their preset series of question and limited 
range of possible answers, the probabilistic procedure allows assessors to bring to bear 
any line of argument that they believe may differentiate between the possible causes 
of the event. In particular, as was illustrated with the example case, the probabilistic 
procedure, unlike global introspection or SAM, can directly incorporate quantitative 
information from case series and epidemiological studies. And, of course, the 
probabilistic procedure allows assessors to take into account their uncertainty about 
what actually happened in any particular case and about the theories and assumptions 
that they use to analyze the case material. 
(3) Localization: When the probabilistic procedure is successfully implemented, 
the assessment tasks that require the actual exercise of expert judgement are 
sufficiently localized that the assessors' knowledge and experience can be directly 
applied. Experts know about frequencies and theoretical mechanisms, not about how 
to establish the relative importance of various streams of evidence that may point in 
different directions. There is an additional value to localization: it is much easier to 
identify and then to resolve the sources of disagreement between experts on the local 
than the glob al level. 
(4) Coherence: The method by which the various sources of evidence· are merged 
into an overall. global RCA is completely inexplicit in global introspection and thus not 
open to critical examination. For SAM, the methods for converting answers to localized 
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subproblems into overall probability ratings are completely arbitrary. In contrast, the 
probabilistic method combines local judgements into global causality assessments by 
means of rules whose use are justified by the normative theory of coherent reasoning 
as developed by de Finetti. In my experience, expert assessors exposed to this theory 
understand and appreciate its normative force, and willingly accept the division of 
duties that assigns to them the task of quantifying their expert clinical and theoretical 
knowledge and leaves to the rules of probability the task of synthesis and inference. 
In addition to these general advantages, the probabilistic procedure provides 
simple, canonical solutions to a number of difficult problems in the study of adverse 
drug effects that resist effective treatment by the alternative methods. I will briefly 
discuss two of these: the problems of multiple drugs and of missing information: 
( 1) Multiple drugs: The problem of multiple drug causal candidates is one of the 
most difficult aspects of causality assessment. None of the SAM deals with this 
problem in a satisfactory way. First, there is the conceptual difficulty of interpreting 
just what the result of a RCA means: the SAM give as output a qualitative probability 
rating, but their authors do not define these ratings (or say what to do with theml), so, 
for example, most of the SAM make it possible to report many "probable" drug causes 
of a single event E. For the probabilistic procedure, this issue is clarified by the notion 
of a probability distribution over the cause list, defined as a set of mutually exclusive, 
exhaustive propositions. 
In addition, there is a kind of psychological difficulty that seems to affect most 
assessors, especially when they try to solve a RCA problem with global introspection: 
they have a hard time evaluating the evidence when there is more than one drug 
causal candidate around to think about. This problem is easily handled 
probabilistically, by means of the "one-drug-at-a-time strategy" . This strategy works 
as follows. Suppose D1, ••• , Dn are the drug hypotheses on the cause list, and N is the 
union of all nondrug causes. Let Ai represent "Di or N" ( that is, Ai is the hypothesis 
that ff B was caused by a drug, the drug cause was Di). Also, let PO(Di) represent the 
posterior odds in favor of cause Di, and PO(DilAi) the posterior odds in favor of cause Di, 
given Ai. That is, PO(DilAi) solves the causality assessment problem for a case 
otherwise identical to the one under consideration, except that there is only a single 
drug causal candidate, Di. 
The following formula, which is a consequence of the rules of coherence, gives 
PO(Di) in terms of the conditional posterior odds: 
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(4) 
Thus, when faced with a problem in which more than one drug candidate appears on 
the cause list, assessors can solve the problem by first addressing a series of problems 
each of which has only a single drug candidate, and then amalgamating the solutions to 
these problems using equation (4). While this strategy is not logically necessary, 
experience shows that its use does reduce assessors· confusion and hence incoherence 
considerably when they confront problems involving more than one possible drug 
cause. 
(2) Missing Information: Since they are designed to be used on information 
derived from "third party" reports, causality assessment methods should be able to 
take into account what information is not available, as well as that which is. Neither 
global introspection nor SAM do well in this regard. Experts who are asked to carry 
out causality assessments based on spontaneous reports frequently say they cannot do 
so, without the results of this test or the exact time at which that occurred; while 
others may base their assessments entirely on plausible but highly improbable 
scenarios that posit particular values to missing quantities and ignore the possibility 
that these assumptions are in error. SAM tend either to erc/ude missing information 
from consideration or to count it against the hypothesis of drug causation. How 
missing information can be handled probabilistically will now be demonstrated, with 
respect to two important and common problems. 
Noncompliance: A drug cannot cause an event if the patient did not take the drug. 
We generally know that a patient was prescribed a drug; our knowledge that he 
actually took the drug as prescribed is not usually so certain. Here is the probabilistic 
solution to the problem of noncompliance, when only one particular administration of 
the drug is under consideration. 
Let Com be the proposition that the patient was compliant: he took the drug D as 
prescribed. Let B be background information as defined previously; so B includes the 
statement that the patient took D (that is, Com) and subsequently experienced an event 
of type Et. Now let B0 consist of the noncase information in B, plus the information that 
a patient with condition M who was prescribed (but did not necessarily taktA D 
experienced an event of type Et. That is, B is the intersection of B0 and Com. 
The following can then be derived from the rules of coherence: 
(5) P(D->E I B0, C) P(D+> E I B0, C) = 
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P(D->E I B, C) 
P{Com IM) • P(D+>E I B, C) 
In this expression, P{Com IM) is the probability that a "generic patient" with condition 
M prescribed D will comply with his presc~iption; it is oot calculated conditiQnally on 
the patient experiencing an event of type Et· 
Thus, equation (5) can be read as follows. First. evaluate the chance that a patient 
with condition M who is prescribed D would comply with this prescription. Next. 
evaluate the posterior odds inf avor of D-causation for the particular case under 
consideration, assuming that the patient actually took Das prescribed. Finally, to 
calculate coherently the posterior odds that D caused E without assuming compliance, 
multiply the results of the previous two evaluations together. 
Missing 'Yitai' Case Information: When assessors must rely on third party case 
information, they may think of some item of missing information that, for them, would 
play a decisive role in their causality assessment were it available (for example: 
whether the woman in the example case were alcoholic; or whether or not her bilirubin 
level was elevated on day 67). Suppose A is a case information proposition which, if 
known, would have differential diagnostic significance for the causality assessment. 
How should the fact that neither A nor Ac is specified in the given data affect the 
resulting assessment? Let A* denote the information that neither A nor Ac is specified, 
and LR(A*) the contribution of A* to the posterior odds. The problem, then, is to 
evaluate the quantity LR(A *). 
At first sight, it might seem that "negative information" like A• should have no 
effect on the causality assessment. However, the assessment would have a very 
different result if A were known to be true than if it were known to be false, and A* 
should affect the assessors· opinions about how likely A is to be true. For suppose that 
whoever submits the report has some chance of appreciating the significance of the 
truth of A and may therefore have sought to ascertain it: then the chance that the 
report is submitted at all and, given that it is, that neither A nor Ac is mentioned in it, 
depends to some extent on whether A or Ac is true. Thus, A* should affect the overall 
causality assessment. 
The quantitative effect of A* is given by the following formula, determined by the 
rules of coherence: 
(6) LR(A*) = p + {(1-p) • LR(Ac)) 
where 
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a 
P = a + be ' 
a = P( A* I A), b = P( A* I Ac ) - P( A* I A), and 
C = P(AC I B, D+>E, S). 
Here, S is the case information chronologically preceding A. Now c is just the 
denominator of LR(Ac), and hence would be evaluated in the course of assessing this 
likelihood ratio factor. The quantities a _and b measure the assessors· opinion of the 
process whereby the case i11formalion came to them: that is, for a, they have to decide 
how likely they thinks it is that the case report would not mention A; if A were 
actually true (and also, for b, if A were false). 
Frequently, A gives strong information inf avor of one of the causal candidates 
( usually nondrug), while Ac gives weak evidence (by default) for the other candidates. 
In such cases, it is reasonable to believe that the author of the case report is more 
likely not to mention anything about A when A is false than when it is true. From 
equation (6), it then follows that LR(A*) can be regarded as an average of two 
components: 1, which is the appropriate likelihood ratio factor for information that 
does not discriminate at all between drug and nondrug causation; and LR(Ac ), the 
likelihood ratio factor that would be appropriate if A were known to be false. The 
more likely there is to be no mention of A when A is false than when it is true, the 
more LR(A*) will resemble LR(Ac ). Note that if A is always mentioned when it is true, 
then LR(A*) equals LR(Ac) (since A*then implies Ac); while if there is no mention of A 
just as frequently when A is true as when it is false (sob a 0), then LR(A*) equals 1 
( that is, there is no information in A*). 
In summary, to evaluate the likelihood ratio corresponding to the fact that a 
potentially vital piece of case information, A, is simply not mentioned, do the following: 
evaluate LR(Ac) and its denominator, P(Ac I B, D+>E, S); evaluate P(A* I A) and P(A* I Ac): 
now calculate LR(A * ) from equation ( 6 ). 
S. CURRENT DEVELOPMENT 
Currently, there are two lines of development in the project of creating and 
implementing a probabilistic causality assessment procedure. One is concerned with 
applications of the procedure. These applications include such projects as: 
·c 1) structured review of spontaneously generated case reports (for example, 
together with a neurologist at Vanderbilt University, Dr. Gerald Fenichel, I have 
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developed and implemented a procedure for guiding the deliberations of a panel of 
pediatric neurologists assembled by the Centers for Disease Control to review case 
reports received by the Centers on suspected serious neurological adverse effects of 
pertussis vaccinations); 
(2) analysis of drug safety material from premarketing studies (together with Dr. 
Claudio Naranjo, a clinical pharmacologist at the University of Toronto, I developed for 
the manufacturers of a new drug for the treatment of congestive heart f allure 
methodology for carrying out RCA analyses for 10 cases of agranulocytosis among users 
of the drug in a large premarketing observational study -- most of whom were taking a 
whole range of other medications -- and then updating on the basis of these RCA a 
predictive distribution for the incidence of agranulocytosis in future users of the drug); 
and 
( 3) incidence estimation from spontaneous reports ( together with a team of 
pharmacologists from the University of Bordeaux and the Centre de Pharmacovigilance 
Bordeaux-Aquitaine, I am developing a model based upon the probabilistic 
decomposition of RCA that can be used to construct uncertainty distributions for the 
incidence of adverse effects as a function of drug and event type, drug sales history, 
the number of spontaneous reports received by the Centres, and a few other 
observable quantities). 
The other direction of work on probabilistic RCA involves improving the 
procedure conceptually and technically. The most important conceptual problem has to 
do with the expression of 11uncertainty about uncertainty", and the approach we are 
taking to this problem is to assess probability dis~ributions that describe the panel's 
collective uncertainty about a given probability assessment. Because almost all of the 
probabilities assessed in the procedure bear frequency interpretations, it is possible to 
interpret these distributions in terms of uncertainty about these frequencies, and we 
have not found that the experts feel quite comfortable assessing such uncertainty 
distributions. We have not developed adequate methods yet for combining these 
distributions (unless we assume independence or some other simple specification for 
their joint distributions) to induce an overall uncertainty distribution on the posterior 
odds, but we are currently working on this problem. 
The technical difficulties involve a number of modelling, elicitation, statistical and 
computational problems that must be solved before the procedure (and subjective 
probability) can reasonably be expected to find widespread use in the pharmaceutical 
industry, regulatory agencies and the medical community in general. Many of these 
problems are related to the speed with which the procedure can be carried out -- at 
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present, it is in general slow work, as shown by the example case, which occupied the 
panel for three sessions over a four week period, as well as many hours of the research 
assistant's time. Of course, it must be realized that this case was analyzed as part of an 
on-going project whose purpose it is to explore and develop the probabilistic 
procedure; the cases that are analyzed in this project were especially selected for their 
difficultyl Currently, five panels, consisting of experts from academia, industry and 
two national monitoring and regulatory agencies, are cooperating in this project. 
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CASE PARAMETERS 
Clinical Condition (Ml: 
- middle-aged French woman 
- resident in Gabon r or 3 years 
- assumed healthy 
Adverse Hvent Type OLl: 
- hepatitis with jaundice ( def: enzymes > 5 I normal, bilirubin > 3 x normal) 
· Time Horizon: 
- 4 months (D O amodiaquine) 
Possible causes: 
- amodiaquine 
- chloroquine 
- NANB 
- alcohol-induced hepatitis 
- hepatitis A 
- hepatitis B 
, I J • 
RELEVANT CASB INFORMATION 
Historical Information: 
Datum: 1st prodrome tiredness, vomiting (T,V) 
Timin1: 
Datum: T.V appear day 36 
Characteristics: 
Data: a) onset of jaundice 12 days after T,V 
b) symptomatology ( days 4.7-49 ): 
i) nofever 
il) no arthralgia 
ill) liver function tests: enzymes 15-20 I normal 
bilirubin 5 I normal 
Dechallenge: (Day 50) 
Data: a) subjective improvement by day 60 
b) jaundice decreasing by day 60 
· Rechallenge: (Day 67) 
Data: a) jaundice, pruritis evident day 70 
b) liver function tests day 70: 
enzymes 20-25 I normal 
bilirubin 18 I normal 
c) hepatic encephalopathy day 83 
d) death with nearly total hepatic necrolysis 
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